It is generally accepted that failure to reason correctly during the early stages of software development causes developers to make incorrect decisions which can lead to the introduction of faults or anomalies in systems. Most key development decisions are usually made at the early system speci cation stage of a software project and developers do not receive feedback on their accuracy until near its completion. Software metrics are generally aimed at the coding or testing stages of development, however, when the repercussions of erroneous work have already been incurred. This paper presents a tentative model for predicting those parts of formal speci cations which are most likely to admit erroneous inferences, in order that potential sources of human error may be reduced. The empirical data populating the model was generated during a series of cognitive experiments aimed at identifying linguistic properties of the Z notation which are prone to admit non-logical reasoning errors and biases in trained users.
Introduction
There are three main questions which form the basis for the research discussed in this paper:
How does the actual performance of software engineers di er from that which is expected or claimed when they are undertaking reasoning tasks using formal notations? Do the results of experiments conducted by cognitive psychologists into the reasoning performance of general populations with natural language carry across into a population of software engineers using formalisms? Can we nd systematic reasoning errors that can be predicted by attributes of the task undertaken or the person performing the task and, if so, can we use this information to build predictive metrics for reasoning performance in software speci cation?
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These questions are related, in that they seek to address aspects of the problem noted by F enton and Kaposi 7, p.293 nearly a decade ago:
In the absence of a suitable measurement system, there is no chance of validating the claims of the formal methods community that their models and theories enhance the quality of software products and improve the cost-e ectiveness of software processes".
Moreover, the methodology adopted for seeking tentative answers to these questions attempts to address the concerns of Craigen et al. 2, p.407 :
One di culty w e encountered in determining the relative advantage of formal methods is the lack o f strong scienti c evidence that the technology is, in fact, e ective. Various surveys have provided reasonably systematic anecdotal evidence of e ective industrial use of formal methods. However, none of the formal methods application projects has used strict, scienti cally based, measurement data".
It is important to stress that the scope of this research i s novel and ambitious, and that the current results comprise more of a proof of concept" than a set of ndings to be widely used by the community of practitioners. It is our hope that the experiments we h a ve carried out are scienti c in the sense that they are repeatable which is usually not the case for anecdotal, case study based exercises, and also in the sense that we have used an existing tried and tested" body of knowledge to permit predictions of hypotheses to be refuted or supported. It is also scienti c in the sense that we make no claims for truth", rather we present some results that others might attempt to refute, thereby extending knowledge and understanding in the eld.
In the rest of this paper we will outline the methodology for the research, present a small sample of the results, and illustrate how we have used these to produce a predictive measure for human error in reasoning about speci cations.
Methodology
In order to render the research questions su ciently concrete for empirical analysis, a notation had to be selected in which to express the tasks. A detailed review of twenty possible notations was undertaken to inform this decision 16 . Z was selected from these as a notation with a stable standard for syntax and a su ciently large user community from which to recruit participants for the experiments. Whilst this inevitably leads to some loss of generality, Z is su ciently similar to many other notations at least, in the features we use in our research that we w ould anticipate the results holding if other notations are used, and checking this empirically would be a simple if resource intensive matter. A small scale pilot study was used to re ne both the experimental methodology and the questions being explored 17 . Two tentative results that came out of this study are of relevance here:
Even when experienced software engineers knew that they were participating in an experiment to study their reasoning errors, errors occurred. For example, in one task every participant made the same error when translating a simple piece of formal speci cation into English. This endorsed the view of the researchers that claims for the use of formal methods as generally applicable technology to improve reasoning performance should not be taken at face value. The errors made in reasoning performance were systematic, in the sense that there appeared to be some property in each task which led to several participants making the same error. Moreover, there appeared to be a high correspondence between the performance we observed and that predicted by the numerous experiments reported in the psychological literature on human reasoning, even though we were formalising the tasks and using participants experienced in these sorts of tasks.
As a result of this pilot study several larger scale empirical studies were proposed, and to date four have been conducted. The decision was taken to focus attention initially on three factors which the pilot study suggested might in uence reasoning performance. The length of time that the participants had spent using Z. This was coupled with a re ective judgement on expertise level. The extent to which the speci cation is abstract", that is, devoid of thematic content, rather than suggesting realistic concepts. The logical constructs used in the speci cation. Participants were divided into two groups for each experiment, abstract formal logic AFL and thematic formal logic TFL, with twenty di erent participants completing the tasks under each linguistic condition. The stimuli for each task comprised a prose description and several Z statements, at least one of which contained a logical rule. These represented the premisses necessary for the inference to be drawn. Participants were also shown four Z statements representing possible conclusions, one of which denoted No valid conclusion" or Nothing", depending on the context. For illustrative purposes we will present an overview of the experiment carried out on conditional reasoning, and provide two examples of tasks. There are four classical forms used in the discussion of conditional reasoning. Two of these, Modus Ponens MP and Modus Tollens MT, permit valid conclusions to be drawn. The other two do not permit valid conclusions, and are usually labelled by the fallacies that arise if conclusions are drawn erroneously, Denial of the Antecedent D A and A rmation of the Consequent AC. For each of these four forms, the two terms involved can be presented in a rmative A or negative N polarity. This gives rise to the sixteen tasks covering all possible combinations in the following table. Two v ersions of each task were formulated in order to test for possible e ects of realistic material; one expressed in abstract terms and one in thematic terms. All abstract tasks described relations between colours and shapes, whereas the thematic tasks described realistic computing applications including: a library database system, a ight reservation system, a missile guidance system, a video lending system, and a vending machine operation. The abstract version of the AC-AN task, for example, was presented as shown below. An asterisk indicates the logically correct conclusion. The same basic form was used for all four studies, which were administered separately over a period of two y ears. All participants were recruited via personal invitation. They were not supervised in completing the tasks, and were not put under time pressure. We should acknowledge the role played by these participants, who were prepared to give up their time to make this research possible, e ectively sitting an examination which was intellectually quite demanding with no obvious bene t to themselves.
Results
Each o f the four experiments yielded data on the performance of participants undertaking a set of tasks, for either the abstract or thematic condition. This was analysed together with the participants' length of experience and level of expertise. Predictions were made regarding the expected outcomes, mainly by reference to the psychological literature. Many of these predictions were con rmed, although some were refuted -a detailed account can be found elsewhere 17 . To illustrate the sort of results obtained, here are some holistic features for the conditional reasoning experiment, and a few snapshots of results that we considered interesting", although we w ould warn of the dangers of taking these out of context. It is important to stress that, as well as analysing the numbers of correct responses, we were also interested in the occasions where several participants made the same incorrect response, as that would indicate systematic errors, such as those suggested in the psychological literature. Moreover, such systematic errors may w ell be overlooked within project teams using techniques such a s w alk-throughs or peer review. Participants' levels of correctness under each experimental condition in the conditional reasoning task revealed overall rank orders as follows: 
The results suggest that few participants experienced any di culty whatsoever in drawing the MP inference, with near ceiling levels observed for all combinations of premiss polarity across both groups. This is supported by natural language based studies in which participants rarely erred when drawing MP inferences, irrespective of the term polarities 3, 5, 14 and the realistic content involved 8, 12 . The lower rates of correct MT inferences drawn in comparison to MP is also well supported 5, 14 . The results suggest that participants experienced some di culty in drawing DA inferences, where up to 30 succumbed to the fallacy, and that participants experienced most di culty i n d r a wing the AC inferences where up to 45 succumbed to the fallacy. The high rates at which participants succumbedto these fallacies when reasoning about abstract material, in particular, is also supported in the cognitive literature 4, 14 . A brief summary of the results in relation to cognitive theories of conditional reasoning biases is given below -readers are referred to 17 for a detailed discussion.
Signs of matching bias 3 were evident for the fallacious DA and AC inferences in the abstract group. Signs of negative conclusion bias 6 were evident for the MT, DA and AC inferences in the abstract group. Signs of facilitation by realism 9 and belief bias 1 were evident in the thematic group. No signs of a rmative premiss bias 6 .
It is important to stress that the results above relate only to one study. It is tempting to overgeneralise these ndings. For example, one might use these results to endorse the prejudice that formalisation which loses thematic content is damaging to reasoning performance in general. Unfortunately, the other studies would not support this view as, on many tasks, the abstract group performed better than the thematic one. These studies served to con rm our predicted answers to two of the research questions: Even experienced software engineers make large numbers of errors when reasoning about speci cations expressed in a formal notation. The nature of the errors seem to correspond very well in general with the systematic errors reported by psychologists working with a general population using natural language.
It is argued that people nd it easier to reason with formal expressions than their informal counterparts 15, 1 8 . Our results suggest that claims for formalisation such as this, which rest upon strong psychological assumptions, are di cult to support. In some speci c areas, however, the use of formal methods or the background of the participants in this study does seem to improve matters.
A Predictive Model of Error
The results obtained so far allow u s to proceed to the nal part of the research program: using the data collected to explore the possibility of constructing predictive models which will allow us to predict the likelihood of errors being made by a particular individual working on a particular problem. Once again we will illustrate the technique by reference to the study of conditional reasoning. In order to quantify how far each v ariable contributed to participants' levels of performance, a logistic regression analysis was used to model the data points generated. The table below shows that the variance in participants' correctness was accounted for, rst, by the reasoner's level of expertise then, second, by the type of inference to be drawn and, third, by the degree of meaningful content in task material. The 2 values may b e i n terpreted as the improvements to the accuracy of the model's predictions each time a signi cant v ariable was added as a parameter to the model in a forward stepwise manner. Although the accuracy of a logistic regression model's predictions generally increases along with the numberof input parameters it allows, there comes a point at which the inclusion of new parameters does not improve the accuracy of the model signi cantly. This explains why polarity type has been excluded as a parameter from the model and a t" to the observed data has been achieved using only three parameters: expertise level, inference type and material type. One measure of how w ell a regression based model ts its data is to classify the proportion of predictions given by the model which are consistent with the observed data points from which the model was generated 11 . The
Classi cation-t" for our model is 87.81. Given that only 12.19 of our data points were misclassi ed, this suggests that the model provides a reasonable t to the data. An alternative measure, called the Goodnessof-t", compares the observed probabilities with those predicted by the model 11 . Using this measure it is possible to calculate the Percentage of variability" in the data accounted for by the model. This is obtained by dividing the sum of the input parameters' improvements to the model by the Goodness-of-t value for the model with no explanatory input parameters. This calculation tells us that 18 variance in the observed data is predictable by our model. A logistic regression analysis generated the results shown below. This table shows: how our signi cant experimental variables became encoded as input parameters to the model, their relative contributions to participants' correctness , the standard error SE, the degrees of freedom DF, and their signi cance p. x is the variable mean, calculated as the summation of the values for each factor in the variable, divided by the number of factors in the variable. The regression constant, Const, refers to the overall mean probability of being correct independent of the in uence from other variables. The estimates yielded by a logistic regression show the extent to which each of their corresponding factors in uence the dependent v ariable. In the context of our reasoning studies, as increases in value so does the participants' likelihood of being correct under the corresponding experimental condition. These values represent the parameters for our conditional model of inferential complexity. According to 10 , the odds" of an event occurring are calculated by the probability that it will occur divided by the probability that it will not. The summation of the estimates give the log of the odds, or logit" value, as shown in the following general formula.
logitMaterial; Inference; Expertise = Const + M1 + I1 + I2 + I3 + E1 + E2
The following examples demonstrate how the formula can be applied to calculate the logit values for conditional inferences under a range of conditions. They also illustrate how the calculations are always performed relative to the regression constant. The model developed thus far provides a means by which the users of formal methods can predict the likelihood that a reasoner of a given expertise will draw a n inference of a given type about a given type of logical statement expressed in a given degree of thematic material. At present the model yields logit values which appear to have little meaning in isolation. What we are lacking is a means for translating these values into absolute probabilities 0 p 1. The following formula performs the necessary translation 11 .
p = e z 1+e z : : : where z is the logit value, and e is the exponential function.
Similar models have been produced from the results of the other three studies.
A Brief Demonstration
Let us consider how these predictive models might be used in practice. We can envisage Will Wise, a senior software developer working on a defence based project, having been presented with the operational speci cation for a guided missile system, shown as follows. Suppose that Will is asked by his team leader to determine the implications of including schema MissileStatus within schema MissileCheck. Given that the speci cation is expressed in realistic material, whose variable identi ers refer to rather fast moving animate objects, we can safely classify its material as being thematic in nature. Supposing Will had acquired a fair amount of Z experience by formally verifying part of a previous project, had studied several systems of logic at university and had even gone on expensive Z training courses, we might be inclined to regard Will as an expert Z user. If we w ere to analyse the logic of the terms involved we w ould see that the consequent o f a conditional rule is being denied, which suggests that Will is being invited to draw a modus tollens inference. We n o w h a ve the three parameters that we need to apply our model of conditional reasoning: the material type Thematic, the type of inference to be drawn MT, and the Z expertise of the reasoner Expert. The question that we must ask is: How likely is Will to infer the logically correct conclusion, current = target, under these conditions? Application of the model predicts that Will is 95.6 likely to draw this conclusion, which is calculated as follows. To translate into an absolute probability: p = e z =1 + e z p = e 3:0789 =1 + e 3:0789 p = 0 :9560 Now suppose that the same speci cation and instructions had been given to Sam Slow, a new recruit and self-professed novice" Z user. Suppose also that the speci cation given to Sam was not expressed in thematic material at all, but used single letters for variable names seemingly bearing little relation to real world objects, as shown below. How would these changes a ect Sam's ability to infer the logical conclusion, p = q? In the absence of a statistical method, most software engineers would make a subjective, educated guess based on their intuitive feelings towards the situation. The scope of the model is fortunately su cient to account for such factors and can provide us with a much more quanti ably precise estimate. The question arises, however, of whether Sam's team leader would be prepared to risk the 35 di erential in probability that Sam would not reach the same logical conclusion as Will, given the criticality of the inference. Now consider the revised version of our missile system's formal speci cation shown below. If we analyse the logic of the terms following the schema inclusion we see that the antecedent of the conditional is being a rmed, which suggests that a much simpler, modus ponens, inference is required. Supposing Will and Sam are asked to determine the implications of the schema inclusion, the model predicts that their potential for failing to draw the logical conclusion, current = target, has decreased to just 0.5 and 2.9 respectively. It should now be clear that application of the model has strong implications for the ways in which formal speci cations are written and for the levels of expertise acquired by those people who work with them.
We h a ve hopefully illustrated that a scienti c approach to the questions posed at the outset of this paper is both possible and fruitful. The experiments are repeatable and easily extended, to add con dence or refutation and generalisation. The predictive metrics appear to have most of the desirable properties suggested in the literature 13 , although space has not allowed us to illustrate this, and are easily applied to simple problems. There are, however, still many important issues that need addressing before this sort of approach can be seen as approaching an industrial strength tool. We have dealt with simple logical constructs, but have not yet tackled the problems of compound constructs, involving several layers of nested forms. Little work has been done on this in the cognitive psychology community either, and so we will be attempting experiments with little experience to build upon. Similarly, w e need to address alternative t ypes of formal method, such as process algebras, whose structure does not map so easily onto logical reasoning in natural language. We see no reason, however, why such areas should not be put on a rm scienti c basis in the fullness of time. Hopefully this paper will also lead to the research community raising many more such questions that can be tackled in a scienti c manner. 
